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Abstract—Nowadays, there is an increasing interest in the
development of Autonomous Vehicles (AV). However, there are
two types of attack challenges that can affect AVs and are yet
to be resolved, i.e., sensor attacks and vehicle access attacks.
This paper, to the best of our knowledge, is the first work that
proposes a novel authentication scheme involving DRAM power-
up unique features using deep Convolutional Neural Network
(CNN), which can be used to implement secure access control
of autonomous vehicles. Our approach consists of two parts.
First, we convert raw power-up sequence data from DRAM cells
into a two-dimensional (2D) format to generate a DRAM image
structure. Second, we apply deep CNN to DRAM images, in
order to extract unique features from each memory to classify
them for authentication. To evaluate our proposed approach,
we utilize data from three Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS)
DRAMs taken under various environmental and other conditions
(high/low temperature, high/low supply voltage and aging effects).
Based on our results, our proposed authentication method
“DRAMNet” achieves 98.63% accuracy and 98.49% precision.
In comparison to other state-of-the-art CNN architectures, such
as the AlexNet and VGGNet models, our DRAMNet approach
fares equally well or better than them.
Index Terms—Physical Unique Feature, Convolutional Neural
Network, Security, DRAM.
I. INTRODUCTION
Autonomous vehicles are increasingly getting popular with
developments in sensor technology as well as controls and
communication protocols. Security is one of the key aspects
to be considered in the design of AV components and systems,
which have to communicate with each other and with simi-
lar systems in surrounding vehicles to ensure collision-free
movement. With Internet of Things (IoT) being an integral
part of AVs, it is necessary to implement robust techniques
of authentication to prevent hacking of these systems, such
as [1], allowing secure access to the black box and ensuring
that counterfeit components are detected accurately during
assembly. Similar concerns can be seen in other applications.
Delivery drones are Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) uti-
lized to transport packages, food, medicine, or other goods.
With high demand for a prompt and efficient delivery, a drone
delivery system can be an effective solution for timely de-
liveries and especially for emergency management. However,
current delivery drone systems lack crucial security functions.
Drones may have to operate in unsupervised hostile areas,
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and therefore be vulnerable to physical capture in addition
to conventional cyber attacks. Security solutions and methods
need to be cost-efficient in terms of resource usage to be
suitable for resource-limited AV and UAV systems. Among
various techniques to enhance the security, Physical Unclon-
able Functions (PUFs) are very popular since they are easy to
implement, hard to predict, and difficult to duplicate. The idea
of a PUF was first proposed by Gassend et al. in [2]. They
developed the first silicon PUFs through the use of intrinsic
Process Variability (PV) in deep sub-micrometer Integrated
Circuits (ICs). They used the intrinsic PV of the manufacturing
of silicon devices to produce unique, random and unclonable
digital responses and called it a PUF. Generally, a PUF is a
function that is embodied by a physical device, which maps
inputs to outputs, creating challenge-response pairs (CRPs).
PUF is a completely new technology for the protection of
credentials.
In this work, we focus on a new authentication method
that is based on the intrinsic properties of DRAM power-up
values using deep CNN, which we call DRAMNet. To do this,
we have considered three COTS DRAM memories and tested
their power-up values under various environmental conditions
i.e. normal condition, high temperature, low temperature, high
voltage, low voltage and aging. Besides the traditional PUFs
that require CRPs to authenticate the chip, our proposed
scheme works based on a deep learning classifier scheme using
DRAM images. DRAM images are constructed using the 2D
structure of the memory cells at power up. Then, we apply
CNN to extract unique features from each DRAM in order to
distinguish each device. In this paper, we describe the notion
of physical unique features and argue that this new method
of authentication can be implemented using DRAM power-up
measurements.
Contributions: Specifically, this paper makes the following
contributions:
1). We measure the power-up values of three COTS DRAMs
under different environmental condition (normal condition,
high temperature, low temperature, high voltage, low voltage,
and aging).
2). We convert the raw power-up sequence data from DRAM
cells into a 2D format and then generate DRAM images.
3). We apply a deep convolutional neural network scheme to
the DRAM images to classify each device for authentication
purposes.
4). We examine the quality of the proposed DRAMNet model
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2based on various metrics such as F-score, Precision, Recall
and Accuracy; followed by a comparative evaluation of the
proposed model against two other CNN models, namely
AlexNet and VGGNet.
5). We study the applicability of our DRAMNet scheme, in
such applications as autonomous vehicles and unmanned aerial
vehicles.
Paper Organization: The rest of the paper is structured as
follows. We provide a literature review of previous works in
Section 2. DRAM organization and properties are described
in Section 3. Section 4 presents our proposed DRAMNet
technique in detail. Experimental results and validation of the
DRAMNet scheme is demonstrated in Section 5. Section 6
discusses DRAMNet applications in the real world. Finally,
concluding remarks and future works are given in Section 7.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
In recent years, security primitives based on the physical
characteristics of DRAM have been examined in considerable
detail. In particular, recent works have investigated the poten-
tial of a number of characteristics of DRAM cells to serve as
the basis for the implementation of such security primitives
as Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) and true random
number generators [3]. More specifically, the power-up values
of the DRAM cells [4], their data remanence and data retention
characteristics [5], [6], as well as their latency variations [7],
[8], are all physical characteristics of DRAM modules that
have been used in order to implement security primitives.
Finally, we also observe that even unwanted properties of
DRAM, such as its susceptibility to row hammering [9], have
been utilized for the implementation of DRAM-based security
primitives.
However, although a number of related works regarding the
usage of DRAM as a security primitive exist, to the best of
our knowledge, this is the first work to connect the unique
characteristics of DRAM cells with the emerging field of
machine learning. We note that previous works have most
often utilized machine learning as a way to attack the so-called
“strong” PUFs [10], [11], [12], [13] that were based on the
physical variations of delay elements. Nevertheless, one of the
very first works to combine the field of machine learning with
the idea of security based on unique physical characteristics,
actually proposed taking advantage of the information that
cannot be revealed through machine learning, in order to pro-
vide secure key storage based on the physical characteristics
used to implement “strong” PUFs [14]. Additionally, pattern
matching, which is a concept related to machine learning, has
been proposed as an efficient way of implementing secure
key generation using the physical characteristics of memory
cells [15]. Finally, we also note that the nonlinear behavior of
cellular neural networks itself has been employed in the past
in order to create a PUF [16].
III. DRAM DESCRIPTION AND PROPERTIES
DRAM is a memory module that is most often an inherent
component of modern computer systems. Therefore, DRAM-
based security primitives tend to be highly cost-efficient and
practical. Additionally, as contemporary DRAM modules are
of a significantly large size (usually of some gigabytes), they
allow for the extraction of a relatively large amount of unique
features, based on their physical characteristics. For example,
security primitives based on the power-up values of the DRAM
cells offer a significantly larger amount of entropy than the
security primitives that are based on the power-up values of
SRAM cells, due to the significantly larger size of DRAM
modules [4]. In general, DRAMs seem to be the most common
type of memory in use today, can hold more data than SRAM
and are significantly more cost-efficient to manufacture. In
comparison, SRAMs require four times the amount of space
needed by DRAMs, in order to store a given amount of data.
DRAM modules tend to be organized in a complex way,
consisting of banks that incorporate arrays of several matrices
of cells. For reasons of simplicity, we chose not to demonstrate
this complex layout, but focus on a single matrix of cells,
as shown in Fig. 1. Each individual DRAM cell consists of
a gatekeeper transistor and a storage capacitor, as shown in
Fig. 1, and stores a single bit, based on the charge state of its
capacitor. In a matrix of cells, all the gates of the transistors of
DRAM cells of the same row are connected to a single Word-
Line (WL), which enables access to all the cells of that row at
the same time. In a similar fashion, the cells of each column
of a matrix of cells are all connected to a single BitLine (BL
or BL*), which is used to gain access to the charges of their
capacitors. As each wordline allows access to all the cells of a
row at once, the logical values of all the cells of a single row
can be read or written at the same time using the bitlines. For
this reason, adjacent bitlines are usually working as a pair,
so that when one bitline (BL) is charged or discharged, the
other (BL*) is, respectively, discharged or charged. Reading
or writing a particular cell, or row of cells, is done by charging
up the corresponding wordline and measuring the difference
in the charge of the corresponding bitline(s) through sets of
equalizers and sense amplifiers that connect adjacent bitlines.
The logical value of a cell is determined based on whether
the charge of its corresponding capacitor is above or below a
certain threshold voltage value. Additionally, as the capacitors
are not ideal, the charge stored in them slowly leaks away,
therefore necessitating their frequent recharging, through an
operation known as DRAM refresh. Due to this operation, this
type of RAM is called Dynamic in contrast to Static RAM
(SRAM), which does not need to be refreshed. Furthermore,
we also observe that, when different cells are charged, they
may signify either a logical “1” (true cells – connected to BL)
or a logical “0” (anti-cells – connected to BL*).
Finally, we note that the values of DRAM cells may be
affected by various environmental conditions, such as temper-
ature and voltage variations, as well as the effects of aging.
Therefore, for the purposes of this work, we have stressed
three commercial COTS DRAM modules under high/low
temperature, high/low supply voltage and aging, by applying
the techniques described in [4], [18] and by using a Temptronic
TP04100A ThermoStream Thermal Inducting System, in the
setup shown in Fig. 2. The Thermostream system delivers
controlled temperature with speed and precision to devices
and modules for thermal cycling and testing. It has, therefore,
3Fig. 1: Internal DRAM organization. DRAM is organized in banks, each of which contains matrices of cells. Each cell consists
of an access transistor and a storage capacitor.
been used not only to test the effects of temperature variations
from 0 C to 80 C on the power-up values of the DRAM cells,
but also to accelerate their aging.
IV. OUR PROPOSED DRAMNET TECHNIQUE
A. DRAMNet Advantages
The advantages of DRAMNet method are as follows:
1). The enrollment time required is much less than that
required for the enrollment of CRPs for a PUF-based authen-
tication method.
2). The number of samples required for enrollment are sig-
nificantly fewer than those required for the enrollment of
a “strong” PUF that provides multiple CRPs and the CNN
approach does not require an error correction mechanism,
unlike “weak” PUFs, which only provide a noisy CRP and,
therefore, require error correction.
3). Since our DRAMNet scheme is based on deep CNN
architecture, we can adapt pre-trained state-of-the-art models
such as AlexNet and VGGNet to decrease the enrollment
period.
4). DRAMNet can reduce the matching and storage complexity
in the system. For example, “strong” PUFs need to store
a large number of CRPs in a database for matching, while
DRAMNet needs only one set of DRAM power-up values to
be embedded into a compact template.
B. DRAM Cells 2D Structure and Images
In this work, we generate unique features from DRAM
modules, in order to authenticate a device. The advantage of
using memory as a source of authentication is that DRAM
is present on most computer systems and can be used for
generating device-specific signatures without requiring any
additional circuitry or hardware. In our experiments, we uti-
lized three 1-Mbit DRAMs, which we call them DRAM1,
DRAM2, and DRAM3. The power-up values of each DRAM
are measured under both normal condition and various en-
vironmental and other variations, such as high voltage, low
Fig. 2: DRAM power-up experiments under various environ-
mental conditions; Thermostream system (left side) and FPGA
setup with DRAM (right side).
voltage, high temperature, low temperature and aging effects.
Fig. 2 shows our experimental setup consisting of a Spartan 6
FPGA board and DRAM, on the right side of the picture, and
our Temptronic TP04100A ThermoStream thermal inducting
system, which was used for testing memories, on the left
side of the picture. After capturing raw cell power-up values,
we convert our binary data into a two-dimensional structure,
consisting of multiple rows and columns. For example, for
each measurement of our 1-Mbit DRAMs, a 2D structure of
1024 rows by 1024 columns is created. We then use these 2D
structures as inputs to produce DRAM images for the deep
CNN architecture. The reason of using 2D structures is their
suitability for deep CNN, since one-dimensional sequence data
downgrade the performance of the authentication. We then
transform these 2D structures of power-up measurement into
gray-scale images using MATLAB functions, as shown in
Fig. 3. The proposed CNN architecture is discussed in the
following subsection.
C. CNN Architecture for DRAM
Our classification method consists of the following steps:
data acquisition, DRAM data pre-processing, and CNN clas-
sification. The DRAM power-up data discussed in this paper
are obtained from COTS memories. We transform every single
4Fig. 3: Converted images corresponding to each DRAM (a–c),
contour plots for the DRAM images (d–f).
DRAM measurement into a 1024 x 1024 gray-scale image
since our CNN model requires two-dimensional image as an
input. Fig. 4 shows the procedures utilized in the designed
CNN model. Deep learning models generally contain input,
hidden, and output layers. Our designed CNN model can be
divided into inputs (DRAM images), convolution methods,
pooling layers for reducing the size of images, fully-connected
layers for classification, and output layers (labels for each
DRAM). First, each DRAM image is entered into an input
layer to be then classified. Second, the convolution layer is
connected to the physical unique features of DRAM image and
calculates the dots product between this connected area and its
own weighted value. Thirdly, the pooling layer performs down-
sampling per dimension and outputs the decreased volume. In
the fully-connected layer, all nodes are interconnected, and the
result of each node is calculated by the matrix multiplication of
the weight and adding a bias to it. Finally, in the output layer,
all classes are converted into a probability via the Softmax
function and are classified according to the highest probability.
The architecture of our CNN model is shown in Table I.
Additional details regarding the CNN are discussed below:
Regularization: In order to reduce the overfitting in the train-
ing phase, regularization is applied, through what is typically
referred to as L1 and L2 normalizations [17]. In this paper,
we applied L2 regularization as indicated in Eq. 1:
argmin
w
=∑
j
(t(X j)−∑
i
ωihi(X j))2+λ∑
i=1
k|ωi| (1)
where ωi is a weight vector, which parametrizes the space of
functions t(X j) that we are interested in considering. λ indi-
cates how much we are penalizing the norm of ω. Additionally,
we used dropout and batch normalization methods [19] for
deep CNN models to avoid overfitting. In this paper, we
applied batch normalization before the activation function and
after the convolution layer. Dropout with a probability of 0.5
was applied after the batch normalization layer of the fully-
connected block.
Cost function: To evaluate the effective performance of
training neural networks, a cross-entropy function is used to
minimize the difference between the given training DRAM
TABLE I: Architecture of the Proposed CNN Model
Type Kernel size Stride #Kernel Input size
Layer1 Conv2D 3 x 3 1 3 1024 x 1024 x 1
Layer2 Conv2D 3 x 3 1 64 1024 x 1024 x 3
Layer3 Pool 2 x 2 2 1024 x 1024 x 64
Layer4 Conv2D 3 x 3 1 128 512 x 512 x 64
Layer5 Pool 2 x 2 2 180 x 512 x 512
Layer6 Conv2D 3 x 3 1 192 256 x 256 x 128
Layer7 Pool 2 x 2 2 128 x 128 x 192
Layer8 Full 2048 128 x 128 x 192
Layer9 Full 2048 2048
Layer10 Out 3 2048
image and the desired output. The relevant cost function is
defined as Eq. 2:
C =− 1
N∑[d lny+(1−d) ln(1− y)] (2)
where n is the batch size, d is the desired output, and y is
the actual value from the output layer. We apply a gradient
decent optimizer function with an initial learning rate of 0.01
and 0.9 decay per 500 steps to minimize the cost function.
Before each epoch, the training set is shuffled and each mini-
batch (16 images) is then picked, thus ensuring each image is
used only once in an epoch.
Optimized CNN classifier architecture: Considering the
above procedure, we designed our CNN model for DRAM-
based authentication using CNN classification. The main
structure of our CNN model is similar to VGGNet, which
optimizes various functions to reduce overfitting and improve
classification accuracy. Table I and Fig. 4 describe the detailed
architecture of our CNN model. The proposed CNN model is
compared to AlexNet [22] and VGGNet [23] in the following
section.
V. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP AND VALIDATION
Experimental Setup: The proposed classifier and two other
CNN models (AlexNet and VGGNet) were implemented in the
Keras Python library with the TensorFlow backend; an open
source software library for deep learning launched by Google.
For our experiments, we have tested 180 measurements in
total from three DRAMs (DRAM1, DRAM2, DRAM3) under
different operating conditions. We specified 60% of the total
measurement data (DRAM images) for training DRAMNet
and the rest for the testing/evaluation phase. Note that for
training data, we ensured that the percentage of DRAM images
selected from each particular DRAM was equal.
Training of the CNN: To train the CNN, Stochastic Gra-
dient Descent (SGD) with momentum [20] is applied for
optimization. SGD reduces the time needed for training, by
using only a batch of the training instances in each iteration.
Therefore the computed error value is biased with respect to
the optimum, but can be performed much faster. Each iteration
over the entire training set (epoch) requires multiple iterations
over the small batches. In addition, the Adam optimizer
function [21] with 0.001 starting learning rate and 0.9 decay
rate is used. Since our network is used as a classifier for
DRAM authentication with three classes, the output layer
contains one neuron per class. Finally, we have applied the
5Fig. 4: DRAMNet authentication network. DRAMNet consists of four convolutional and two fully-connected layers.
SoftMax function to convert these classes into probabilities,
where SoftMax is the probability of the input to belong to
each DRAM.
Evaluation Metrics for Comparison: To evaluate the
effective performance of our proposed system, the following
four metrics are utilized: accuracy, precision, recall, and F-
score. Eq. 3 shows how accuracy, precision, recall, and F1-
score are derived. These four metrics are the most frequently
used performance indicators for machine learning models.
Accuracy=
TP+TN
TP+TN+FP+FN
Precision=
TP
TP+FP
Recall =
TP
TP+FN
F1−Score= 2× Precision×RecallPrecision+Recall
(3)
where TP, TN, FP, and FN represent the number of true
positives, true negatives, false positives, and false negatives,
respectively. Moreover, we have also calculated the Receiver
Operation Characteristic (ROC) curves. This curve shows the
trade-off between False Positive Rate (FPR) and True Positive
Rate (TPR). FPR refers to the rate at which a classifier
incorrectly matches the non-matching data (outlier) to the
target class. TPR refers to the rate that a classifier correctly
matches the matching data (target) to the target class.
Classification Results and Discussion: Table II presents
the summarized performance results of three CNN models,
where DRAMNet refers to our CNN model and AlexNet and
VGGNet refer to other existing CNN architectures. First, the
training data was conducted without augmentation. In this
case, the DRAMNet CNN model achieved 91.23% average ac-
curacy, 89.56% recall, 89.29% average precision and 88.42%
F-score based on the SGD optimizer. Since our DRAMNet
pool is not large enough to achieve the optimal performance,
training DRAMNet data can be enlarged by augmenting the
DRAM images which results in higher authentication accu-
racy. Data augmentation is one of the advantages of applying
images as input data into the deep learning technique. We
augmented DRAM images by cropping each image in six
different ways at the training model. By using this augmen-
tation, our DRAMNet model achieved more than 6% higher
accuracy, recall, precision, and F-score. Surprisingly, the au-
thentication performance is increased by applying the Adam
optimizer technique for all the models. Based on the results
presented in Table II, the AlexNet CNN model exhibits the
best accuracy, recall, and sensitivity precision when we train
the data without augmentation based on the SGD optimizer.
However, the accuracy for AlexNet, VGGNet, and DRAMNet
improved by a factor of 7.4, 6.2, and 8.1, respectively when
data augmentation was applied. The discrimination of recall
between the DRAMNet method and first highest of the other
ones is only 0.06% while the discrimination of precision of the
proposed method and the highest of the other ones is 0.1%.
In general, we note that data augmentation and the use of the
Adam optimizer technique helps all CNN models achieve their
highest accuracy, recall, precision, and F-score. In particular,
the average accuracy of DRAMNet for both original and
augmented data is 94.35% versus 98.63% using the Adam
optimizer. In addition, the average accuracy of AlexNet and
VGGNet is 98.69% and 97.20%, respectively, for augmented
data and using the Adam optimizer. Therefore, we observe
that the DRAMNet and AlexNet approaches obtain the best
classification performance overall. In order to analyze further
the performance of the three CNN models, we also study
the accuracy of their authentication, using ROC curves. The
tradeoff between the TPR and FPR for each CNN model and
each of the three DRAMs, are shown in the ROC curves
presented Fig. 5, and denote the accuracy of each model.
In conclusion, in comparison to the other two state-of-the-
art CNN architectures, i.e. the AlexNet and VGGNet models,
DRAMNet provides equally good, or even better, results.
VI. DRAMNET APPLICATIONS
DRAMNet provides an alternative approach to the tradi-
tional authentication methods. DRAM, as a low-cost and high-
capacity memory, is an ideal choice to meet the constraints of
embedded hardware. Additionally, as most graphics hardware
can inherently support the application of CNN, SDRAM used
in graphics is particularly suited for the implementation of
the DRAMNet method, which utilizes CNN to distinguish the
6(a) (b) (c) (d)
Fig. 5: ROC curves of different DRAMs for (a) DRAMNet based on the SGD optimizer, (b) DRAMNet based on the Adam
optimizer, (c) VGGNet based on the Adam optimizer, and (d) AlexNet based on the Adam optimizer.
TABLE II: Summarized Performance Results
Method Type Accuracy % Recall % Precision % F-score %
SGD Adam SGD Adam SGD Adam SGD Adam
DRAMNet Original 91.23 94.35 89.56 94.21 89.29 94.17 88.42 94.19Augmented 95.52 98.63 95.44 98.29 95.50 98.49 95.47 98.40
AlexNet Original 91.89 96.49 91.52 95.39 89.37 96.41 90.43 95.89Augmented 96.93 98.69 96.81 98.23 96.66 98.51 96.73 98.36
VGGNet Original 91.49 95.44 91.07 94.89 88.73 94.73 89.88 94.97Augmented 94.72 97.20 94.68 96.95 94.34 96.88 94.50 96.91
unique DRAM power-up values of different DRAM modules.
Therefore, DRAMNet can be used to identify and authenticate
different devices, without requiring additional resources. In
particular, DRAMNet can serve to implement secure access
control for AVs and UAVs. In this case, access is only provided
to entities that provide DRAM-based images that DRAMNet
validates as matching its training data. Another application
involves UAVs that deliver goods. In this case, UAVs will only
communicate with entities authenticated though DRAMNet.
A client making a purchase must send a number of DRAM-
based images to the host service (shop), which are then used
to train the corresponding UAV’s DRAMNet, so that it can
identify, authenticate and communicate with that particular
client, by using its DRAMNet implementation to match future
DRAM-based images sent by this client. However, DRAMNet
applications may be vulnerable to data retrieving and man-
in-the-middle or replay attacks. In order to overcome such
potential issues, we suggest that images received should no
longer be stored after being used for enrollment or iden-
tification/authentication and that all communication between
entities use asymmetric encryption.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have presented a novel authentication
method based on DRAM unique features using deep CNN,
“DRAMNet”. Our results indicate that the proposed method
has the potential to be used to secure access control in such
applications as autonomous vehicles and drones. To evaluate
our approach, we utilized data from three COTS DRAM
modules taken under various environmental and other condi-
tions, such as high/low temperature, high/low supply voltage
and aging effects. Based on our results, DRAMNet achieved
98.63% accuracy and 98.49% precision. In comparison to
other state-of-the-art CNN architectures, such as the AlexNet
and VGGNet models, DRAMNet provides equally good, or
even better, results. In the future, we will take generate a
larger number of DRAM measurements, in order to increase
the training pool size of the CNN and improve the accuracy of
authentication. We also intend to try these experiments using
other types of DRAM modules and characteristics.
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